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Abstract: The results from contemporary science, especially the theory of evolution and quantum
physics, seem to favor process theology. Moreover, the evil committed by free will leads some
theologians to reduce divine action in order to prevent God from being responsible for evil. Thus,
among those who defend a particular providence, Molinism finds many followers. This article first
argues that contemporary science does not constrain us to deny particular providence. Second, it
criticizes the implicitly deterministic character of Molinism. Thirdly, a Thomistic solution is proposed
as an alternative which, by means of a different metaphysical approach to cosmic contingency and
freedom of will, defends particular providence without reducing divine activity except in personal
sins.
Keywords: determinism; Molinism; Aquinas; Francisco Suárez
1. Introduction
On a touching dialogue in Crime and Punishment by F. Dostoevsky, a disbelieving
Raskolnikov proves the faith of Sonya, a humble young woman who has been forced to
prostitute herself to support her miserable family, with these piercing questions:
“‘So you pray a great deal to God, Sonya?’ he asked her.
Sonya said nothing. He stood and waited for her answer.
‘What should I do without God?’ she said in a rapid, forceful whisper, glancing
at him for a moment out of suddenly flashing eyes, and pressing his hand with
hers.
‘Well, there is it!’ he thought.
‘And what does God do for you in return?’ he asked, probing deeper.
Sonya was silent for a long time, as though unable to answer. Her flat little chest
heaved with agitation.
‘Be quiet! Do not ask! You are not worthy!’ she exclaimed suddenly, looking at
him severely and indignantly.
‘That’s it, that’s it!’ he repeated to himself, insistently.
‘He does everything’, she said in a rapid whisper, her eyes again downcast”.
Dostoevsky (1998, p. 311)
Sonya could very well be counted among the people “abandoned by God”. Motherless,
with a drunken father, turned into brothel fodder to support her siblings . . . Yet she puts
herself in God’s hands and abandons herself to His providence. Dostoevsky presents her
to us as an icon of traditional faith who, despite her tremendous weakness, through her
love defeats the pretended Übermensch represented by Raskolnikov, the man who relies
only on his own energy.
My purpose in these pages is to take into consideration the thesis of particular prov-
idence defended by classical theism here personified by Sonia: “God does everything”.
All events in human life, whether originated by unconscious nature or produced by free
persons, can be referred back to God in one way or another.
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To do this, I will start first with the view of divine providence put forward by process
theology, an approach that seems to have the results of contemporary science in its favor.
Secondly, I will look at Molinism, which, despite presenting itself as a form of classical the-
ism safeguarding free will in the best possible way, actually contains certain deterministic
factors fatal for it. Thirdly, I will present a Thomistic alternative to this system. My point is
that the Thomistic theology, while attributing to God omniscience and an infallible will,
safeguards freedom and contingency better than Molinism.
2. Indeterminism and God’s Impotence
The idea of a particular providence could contrast with the scientific worldview of
contemporary man, who could look with disdain on the simple confession of faith that
Dostoevsky puts on Sonya’s lips. Of course, events being traceable back to natural causes,
conscious or not, has never been a problem for the notion of providence sustained by
classical theism. However, the various advances in the sciences motivate the revision
of traditional approaches to the subordination of causes to God. For example, some
understand that quantum mechanics would mean a contribution to the debate between
determinism and indeterminism. However, although at first glance quantum mechanics
would seem to favor an indeterministic position, further reflection indicates that it can be
integrated into both a deterministic and an indeterministic framework:
“It is a matter for metaphysical decision which of these alternatives is to be
chosen, a point made clearly enough by the existence of both an indeterministic
interpretation (Niels Bohr) and a deterministic interpretation (David Bohm)
of quantum theory, each having the same empirical adequacy in relation to
experimental results, so that physics by itself cannot settle the issue between
them”.
Polkinghorne (2005, p. xi)
As Polkinghorne attests, the debate is not on the playing field of physics, but is still
situated in the realm of metaphysics. Among the ontological reasons to prefer indeter-
minism, free will stands out. Indeterminism is presented as enjoying the advantage of
“making room” for freedom. Only in a world susceptible of different future states of
affairs, it would be possible for a free agent to bring about varied results for his actions.
In an indeterministic cosmos, however, providence should necessarily be weaker. Thus,
Whitehead’s process philosophy, partly inspired by quantum mechanics (Epperson 2004),
leans toward a certain indeterminism. Accordingly, his disciple Hartshorne (1958) argues
that free will requires causal indeterminism, and Whitehead himself understands divine
action as
“to move, from within, the concrescient opening of beings towards the achieve-
ment of their formal and ontological growth: it is an action that is persuasive,
loving and gentle because it does not interfere with or put conditions on the
freedom of movement of nature and only comes from itself, although under the
impulse of a divine force that is persuasive and not coercive which tries to bring
the world to better itself”.
Montserrat (2008, p. 838)
This divine action at the same time frees God from the burden of the evils of the world.
Moreover, He is not only innocent, but also becomes a sufferer in solidarity with human
beings who suffer:
“God, in some sense, suffers evil in the same way that actual entities do, by seeing
the impulse towards good blocked. God, immersed in process (by way of its
primordial, superjective and consequent nature) is not responsible for Evil but
rather the fellow sufferer that understands, the faithful friend that suffers as we
do, who accompanies us and who understands us”.
Montserrat (2008, p. 839)
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This model of understanding providence has the advantage of making God innocent
of evil in the world but, since it sees Him as powerless to remedy it, He becomes much
less meaningful for the religious man, who cannot count on God’s action in the world
(Böttigheimer 2013, pp. 26–28; Böttigheimer 2016, p. 3). Perhaps Sonya could be comforted
by thinking of God’s compassion for her, a weak God who suffers the same sorrows as she
does by virtue of His divine solidarity. This could perhaps provide her with some moral
support, but He would not be the God “without whom she couldn’t do anything”. The
divine providence of classical theism offers the advantage of providing the believer with
confidence in a God who is truly able to embrace everything under His plan, even evils,
although the role of most of those evils cannot be understood for the moment for us.
One can apply some words addressed by Rousseau to Voltaire to process theology’s
providence. In a letter sent to him on 18 August, 1756, the French philosopher expressed
that questioning divine providence before the so-called “horrendous evils”, instead of
providing relief to man’s sufferings, rather aggravates them:
“You charge on Pope and Leibniz with insulting our evils by maintaining that
all is well [or: good], and you so greatly magnify the picture of our miseries
that you heighten our sense of them; instead of the solace I had hoped for, you
only distress me. It is as if you feared that I might not see clearly enough how
unhappy I am; and believed that you would greatly calm me by proving that all
is bad. | Make no mistake about it, Sir; the effect is the very opposite of what you
intend. This optimism which you find so cruel yet consoles me amid the very
pains which you depict as unbearable”.
Rousseau (1997, pp. 232–33)
A philosophy that dispossesses God of one of His main characteristics for classical
theism, omniscience, and almighty power, risks rendering theism insignificant for human
life: a God powerless against evil is not able to raise hope; we may mourn with the All-
solidary, but we cannot ask Him to “deliver us from evil”. For this, we need the Almighty,
someone capable of sustaining our hope “against all hope” (Rom 4:18).
3. Molinism as a Determinism
A logic similar to the one that permeates process theology had already influenced
classical theism. Even if God is omniscient and almighty, He should have to reduce His
action in free human acts in order to “make room” for free will: such is the Molinist view. In
a way, this system participates in the thesis according to which free will cannot exist if God
determines the results of processes, actions, and changes, hence the need to “make room”
for freedom. Despite this, I will try to suggest that the conception of causality held by
Molinism is not only a theological determinism, but also includes a natural determinism.
A number of scholars hold Molinism today. I take here Craig’s (2000) exposition of
divine knowledge, according to the Molinist position. De Molina (1588) speaks of three
kinds of divine knowledge. The first is the “natural knowledge” by which God knows
Himself insofar He penetrates comprehensively into His divine essence. In knowing
Himself He would also know all the possible creatures that He could create as likenesses of
His essence. By this knowledge, “He knows all the possible individuals he could create, all
the possible circumstances he could place them in, all their possible actions and reactions,
and all the possible worlds or orders which he could create” (Craig 2000, p. 129). In
addition to this natural knowledge, there would be a “free knowledge” that is properly
the foreknowledge of everything that is going to happen. This knowledge is logically
founded on the divine decision to create this precise world with these concrete persons
placed in such and such circumstances. Thirdly, in the middle of both modes of knowledge,
Molinism situates a “middle knowledge”, which is the one by which:
“God knows what every possible creature would do (not just could do) in any
possible set of circumstances. For example, he knows whether Peter, if he were
placed in certain circumstances, would deny Christ three times. By his natural
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knowledge God knew in the first moment all the possible things that Peter could
do if placed in such circumstances. But now in this second moment he knows
what Peter would in fact freely choose to do under such circumstances. This is
not because Peter would be causally determined by the circumstances to act in
this way. No, Peter is entirely free, and under the same circumstances he could
choose to act in another way. But God knows which way Peter would freely
choose. God’s knowledge of Peter in this respect is not simple foreknowledge.
For maybe God will decide not to place Peter under such circumstances or even
not to create him at all”.
Craig (2000, p. 130)
As we see, this “middle knowledge” is intended to explain that a person’s free deci-
sions are not predetermined by God, but are the product of human free will. God merely
establishes the conditions under which free will is to unfold. The outcome depends only
on the created free will. In order to make true the divine knowledge of this outcome, God
must comprehensively understand the nature of each free will, as the same author explains:
“God by his infinite understanding knows each creature so completely that he
discerns even the creature’s free decisions under any conceivable circumstance.
Since the moment of middle knowledge is logically prior to God’s creation, no
actual creatures exist at that moment, but God comprehends them as they exist
in his mind as possible creatures. He knows them so well that he knows what
they would freely do in any situation”.
Craig (2000, pp. 133–34)
The result is a complete foreknowledge of all the contingent events of reality, the fruit
of the combination of a comprehensive penetration into the essence of each free will and
of all the circumstances involved in its action: “Only an infinite Mind could calculate the
unimaginably complex and numerous factors that would need to be combined in order
to bring about through the free decisions of creatures a single human event” (Craig 2000,
p. 135).
A celebrated defender of Molinism such as Plantinga has stated: “I don’t believe
there are any good arguments against counterfactuals of freedom, or middle knowledge, or
the claim that some of God’s actions are to be explained in terms of middle knowledge”
(Tomberlin and Van Inwagen 1985, pp. 378–79). However, I believe that the chief criticism
that can be made of Molinism lies in its conception of causality, which, at the end of the day,
destroys what it was intended to save: free will. This is throwing the baby out with the
bathwater. That Molinism is a theological determinism was already claimed for instance
by Langston (1990, p. 71), but let us read here how Leftow draws the same conclusion in a
recent publication:
“God can control my actions using Molinist tools. Since if I were in a situation S,
I would do A, God can take advantage of this to make me do A, because he can
put me in S. Moreover, a Molinist God cannot stop controlling my actions. If he
creates me, he must put me in one particular situation or another. He controls
the situation in which he puts me in. Therefore, he has control over what I do.
[ . . . ] Therefore, in Molinism, God is compelled to predetermine my choices.
Furthermore, even though God does not cause me to do what I do, but only
puts me in a situation in which I choose to do this without being caused to do
this choice, it is He, not I, who sets my action in motion. [ . . . ] Molinism is a
form of theological determinism. Again, for the world to be deterministic at a
time t it is enough that, given its history from t, it has only one possible future.
[ . . . ] The counterfactuals of free will and divine decisions imply all future history.
Therefore, if God’s decisions are exhaustive, as the Molinists believe, a Molinist
world is deterministic”.
Leftow (2021, pp. 90–91)
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Indeed, if God knows exhaustively every created free will and He decides to place it
in certain circumstances, the result of the divine decision to create that particular person
with his personal idiosyncrasy and place him in those certain circumstances is only one
concrete and determined choice. That is precisely why divine middle knowledge is accurate
according to the Molinist account. Nevertheless, if this is so, then the result is always
deterministic, in the sense that, once God chooses the existence of this personal free will
and these circumstances, the result produced in the world can only correspond to a precise
(supposedly) free decision.
Interestingly, the greatest opponent of Molinism, the Dominican Domingo Báñez,
also a Spanish scholar, already noticed this deterministic nature of Molinism at the time
when this doctrine was born. Before we read his words, let us keep in mind that, in the
Catholic context where these theologians debated, it was crucial to include among the
concurrent factors in a given situation the degree of divine motion, that is, the help or push
coming from God to the human will. According to the Molinists, this motion was not fatal
to freedom of will, because the person was free to use or not to use this impulse to do a
good deed. Moreover, it is a famous and controversial affirmation of De Molina (1588,
p. 53) that, given two men, one could receive a stronger divine impulse than the other and
nevertheless not take advantage of it to do a good action and commit a sin, while the other,
with equal or even less divine help, could perform a virtuous act. Divine foreknowledge,
since it comprehends all the circumstances, including the degree of divine motion that
God freely wants to give, plus the nature of the free will of each person, knows exactly
how each person is going to behave. Let us now read how Báñez proves the deterministic
character of Molinism:
“[ . . . ] I argue in your own way against you. Free will is that which, given all
the requisites to act, can both do one thing and do the opposite (see De Molina
1588, p. 12). Now, given all your requisites for consent, it is impossible for
the will not to consent. Therefore, it does not consent freely. I prove the minor
premise: only three things are necessary for the complete efficacy of the help
of prevenient grace, namely, 1st the entity of the divine help with its force and
motion by which the mind of a human being is stimulated, 2nd the congruence
and accommodation with the free will according to the opportune moment, 3rd
the infallible foreknowledge of God. These three things fulfill divine efficacy.
However, if these three elements are verified, it is impossible for the will not to
consent. Therefore, it does not consent freely. This is confirmed by noticing that
the following consequence is necessary: if these three things are verified, then the
will consents. The ‘antecedent’ [affirmation] is the cause of the ‘consequence’ and
is not in the power of the creature; therefore, neither the ‘consequent’ is in his
power. You will not deny the minor premise [ . . . ]. Therefore the ‘consequent’ is
true”.
Báñez (2021, p. 308)
The sum of the circumstances plus the divine help and nature of each individual’s free
will produce only one effect, a determined choice. In this sense, according to the premises
accepted by Molinism, only one result is possible. The system fails to save what it claims to
defend, namely, free will. This conclusion does not depend on foreign definitions of the
concepts used by Molinists, but it relies on their own conception of free will and divine
motion.
4. A Structural Problem of Molinism: Causal Determinism
There is one central element of Molinism, which indicates an obvious structural limi-
tation: its notion of freedom. No one can argue that people are to some extent predictable
and that the more rational a person is, and the better formed his character is, the more
predictable he is. However, the Molinist idea, according to which God could know the
behavior of a person placed in certain circumstances due to an exhaustive knowledge of
free will, indicates a rather deterministic notion of the very nature of free will. The debate
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about the relationship between divine omnipotence and freedom usually takes place on
a Molinist playing field, for it focusses the notion of freedom on independence from all
external coercion. However, this approach loses sight of the core of free will as explained
by Aquinas. Notice that for Molina himself the opinion of Aquinas was authoritative and
indeed his famous book (the Concordia) was presented as a commentary on some questions
of St. Thomas’ Summa theologiae.
Aquinas’ notion of free will is the capacity for self-determination. Human beings
do not necessarily follow sensory inclinations, but this independence from them is not
the ultimate root of free will (Pilsner 2006, pp. 59–66). This freedom is sustained by the
intellectual potency that grasps the finite nature of the goodness of any election (see for
instance De malo, q. 6). Only an infinite good is wanted in a necessary way. Consequently,
the finitude of the goodness involved in any election makes every election not necessary
even if such election is, so to say, predictable. Let us take the example of a human person
whose inclinations are well integrated thanks to virtue and is even confirmed in grace,
Jesus Christ. If the devil tempts Jesus to blaspheme, He will surely refuse to do it, but He
will act knowing that His election is a finite good that does not constrain the capacity of
the will. The capacity for self-determination depends on an intellectual apprehension and
exists even in such a case like Jesus’ free will. The concrete election cannot come from
the will in a necessary way. Even in the case of Jesus, He can avoid sin in many ways
and none of these is necessary for any will. They are different finite goods that do not
compel the will. Of course, some possibilities are preferable for a given person in a given
set of circumstances, but the will is not constricted to choose them, because the intellect
recognizes that no alternative is necessary. Therefore, another finite good can always be
sought. In that sense, there is nothing in the so-called “singular nature” of a personal free
will that can make it possible to foresee with certainty (not only with a height probability)
how a person will act. It would seem Aquinas means, not even God could foresee it.
To continue this discussion, I want to refer now to Francisco Suárez, who is an
important defender of Molinism, although he disagrees with Molina on some points. He
also affirms that “God understands the capacity and inclination of the human will and all
the ways and means by which it can be inclined to give its consent or to reject it” (Suárez
1599, p. 190). This seems like an idea of divine supercomprehension of free will similar
to Molina’s: choices ultimately spring from a kind of “singular nature” of each free will,
as if this nature would necessitate the precise choice that has to be elected by such person
in such circumstances. According to Echavarría (2017, p. 59), Suárez considered divine
supercomprehension insufficient as the root of the certainty of middle science. However, it
must be recognized that the Jesuit theologian does not offer many more precisions in this
regard either.
On another occasion I have dealt with Suárez’s understanding of freedom, centered
on the impulse of the will, as opposed to the Thomistic idea of freedom as defended by
Báñez (Torrijos-Castrillejo 2021). In this opportunity, I would like to go deeper into the
metaphysical problem embedded in a Molinist way of conceiving reality. To introduce
this kind of exploration, let us read some lines written by the aforementioned Dominican
theologian as a response to Suárez: “[ . . . ] it is astonishing that those assertors understand
how the infallibility of divine providence does not remove the contingency of many natural
effects, and do not understand how divine providence itself determines the acts of free will
without destroying human freedom” (Báñez 2021, p. 142). I believe that Báñez would not
be so surprised had he availed himself of the time to read Suárez more carefully (Báñez
2021, p. 152). In that case, Báñez would have noticed the new metaphysics taking shape in
his mind. Reading the works by this Jesuit, we could find that, when all is said and done,
contingent things are not really contingent for him, but are in fact endowed with necessity:
“If one considers the power and mode of action of the proximate cause of such an
effect [sc. the effect of the lower natural causes, insofar as it happens without the
intervention of some free cause] there is no contingency in such an effect, because
its cause does not possess an intrinsic power of its own to avoid its production
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but works by an intrinsic necessity, given all the requisites. Since this cause is
imperfect and can be impeded in its action by the interference of another, such an
effect can be contingent. Now, such contingent things are called contingent in a
qualified sense (contingentia secundum quid) because they are so only with respect
to a cause that can be impeded by another, but not with respect to the whole of
all the concurrent causes”.
Suárez (1599, p. 289)
This declaration of Suárez’s idea of necessity and contingency is very illuminating
because it puts his metaphysics of causation at antipodes of Aquinas’ one. To explain the
Thomistic account on this topic, I will use a very instructive article by Stephen Brock, where
he compares St. Thomas’ conception to the contemporary idea of “determinism”. Today
we tend to consider deterministic
“the thesis that given the things that there are, with the tendencies or laws of
their natures plus the conditions in which they are found at a given moment, all
subsequent events are inevitable. Thomas is only arguing against doctrines that
hold that the sheer laws of the natures of things, by themselves, make everything
happen necessarily. For his purpose, it suffices to show that the natures of the
things do not themselves completely determine the original conditions, i.e., that
some of the conditions are merely accidental to the things”.
Brock (2002, p. 229)
Aquinas does not admit the first species of determinism because a precise result cannot
necessarily follow from the set of states of affairs that affect the material nature. He is
especially interested in the second type of determinism: an effect cannot necessarily follow
from a contingent cause, that is, by virtue of its intrinsic nature. It is true that he agrees
with Suárez in admitting that, “given a cause, then its effect necessarily follows, unless
there is an impediment” (In Metaph., VI, lect. 3; Thomas Aquinatis 1964, §1193; Brock 2002,
p. 222). However, what kind of necessity is that? Is Suárez right when he says that events
produced by unfree causes and able to be impeded are only contingent in a qualified sense
(secundum quid), but not absolutely contingent (simpliciter contingentes)? Aquinas thinks
exactly the opposite: such a kind of events would be absolutely contingent and would only
be necessary in a qualified sense (necessaria secundum quid). On the contrary, absolutely
necessary events (necessaria simpliciter) would be those that were intrinsically inevitable,
i.e., brought about by a cause that could not be prevented in any way (Brock 2002, p. 231).
An example of a necessary event within the paradigms of physics that he handles is the
motion of the planets.
Suárez understands that an event produced by a cause able to be impeded is “contin-
gent” only because of an extrinsic factor that does not affect the event itself but its cause.
He would probably call this predication of the word “contingent” a denominatio extrinseca,
an external qualification. Quite the reverse, for Aquinas, the very nature of the cause
qualifies the nature of the causation. A cause that acts in a way which is susceptible of
been impeded is a non-necessary one and so are its effects. That is not something alien
to the cause: the possibility of being impeded belongs to its own nature. The nature of
causation is linked to the nature of the cause and the effect is contingent or not because
of the causation itself. Even if, in the case that anything impedes the causation, the effect
follows from a contingent cause, that cannot be considered a necessary effect but in a
qualified sense. Let us read Aquinas himself (Expositio Peryermeneias, I, lect. 15; Thomas
Aquinatis 1989, vol. 1.1, p. 81, 36–42; Torrijos-Castrillejo 2020a, p. 170):
“One cannot simply and absolutely say that everything that is necessarily is and
everything that is not necessarily is not, because it does not mean the same thing
that ‘every being, when it is, is by necessity’ and that ‘every being absolutely
(ens simpliciter) is by necessity’, since the first means hypothetical necessity (ne-
cessitate ex suppositione), while the second means absolute necessity (necessitatem
absolutam)”.
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Contingent events are, in an unqualified sense, contingent. If a certain necessity is
attributed to them, it is merely conditional: supposing that under such precise conditions,
they are actually verified, and then it is “necessary” that they happen. However, this
necessity is conditional or hypothetical and, therefore, must be considered only a necessity
in a qualified sense (secundum quid). As we see, Suárez departs completely from Aquinas’
view in this point and inaugurates a much more “deterministic” conception of nature.
For this reason, in the same article mentioned above, Brock (2002, p. 231) confronts the
conception of causality held by St. Thomas with that of Suárez by quoting a passage from
the Disputationes metaphysicae (19, 10, 5–6), published in 1597, which is very similar to the
one we have copied above:
“A contingent effect in respect to its proximate cause which works naturally, if
compared with the whole order and series of causes in the universe (when any
free cause intervenes either by applying other causes or by removing eventual
impediments), possesses no contingency but necessity [ . . . ]. Thus, it is true,
absolutely and without doubt, with respect to the whole order or arrangement of
agent causes, that there cannot be any contingency in the effects, unless in that
arrangement some free cause intervenes”.
Suárez (1861, vol. 25, p. 736)
It is easy to recognize here a metaphysics very similar to the Stoic one, a position
expressly criticized by Aquinas. He understands that these philosophers identified fate
with “a certain series of causes” affirming “there is nothing that has no cause and, given a
cause, it is necessary to put the effect. If this or that effect happens, it has had a cause and
this cause another cause and so on: as if one is killed at night because he left home, and
he left home because he was thirsty, and he was thirsty because he took something salty;
consequently, since he ate something salty, he died in a necessary way” (Quodlibet, XII, q. 4,
co.). This kind of approach is explained by the fact that the Stoics distinguished necessity
from contingency according to the “external elements that impede events: indeed, they said
that something is necessary if anything can’t prevent it from becoming true; something is
impossible if its truth is always impeded; something is possible if its truth can be impeded
or not impeded” (Expositio Peryermeneias, I, lect. 14; Thomas Aquinatis 1989, vol. 1.1, p.
73, 168–72). Nevertheless, their distinction is invalid because “it is founded on something
external and accidental (per accidens), for something is not necessary because it does not
possess an impediment but, being necessary, then it cannot be impeded” (ibid., 178–81).
Similarly, elsewhere he calls the Stoic view “irrational”, since “we call necessary something
that by its very nature cannot not be, while we call contingent something that happens
frequently and may not be. It is proper to the contingent to have impediment or not to
have impediment, for nature does not prepare an impediment to something that cannot not
be, because to do in this way would be superfluous” (In Phys., II, lect. 8; Thomas Aquinatis
1965, §210). As we are seeing, Aquinas has a very good taste to identify a denominatio
extrinseca, but here he thinks that the fact that something can be impeded or not does not
belong to the relationship of this cause with others, but to a proper characteristic of this
cause and its fallible power: if it would be a true necessary cause, no impediment could
prevent its causality.
Nevertheless, as we have seen above, Suárez establishes necessity by connecting the
causes among them so that he raises all of them to the same level of necessity. There are
no longer the two levels of necessity, and the intrinsic or absolute contingency (simpliciter
contingentia) coined by Aquinas disappeared. In this way, we have a much less rich picture
of physical nature. A type of metaphysics like that of Suárez will fit very well with
Newton’s classical mechanics, as the philosophy of Descartes does. However, it probably
is less able to adapt to the kind of natural reality that contemporary science is discovering.
5. A Thomistic Alternative
These difficulties observed in Molinist metaphysics make it hard to agree with Leftow
(2021, p. 102) when he claims “Molinism is the best version of theological determinism”.
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I would rather suggest that Thomism reveals itself as a more solvent alternative for ad-
dressing the problems involved in the relationship between divine activity and creaturely
contingency. In a certain sense, one might call it a “theological determinism” insofar as
Aquinas admits that divine will is always fulfilled and divine knowledge embraces every
past, present or future event. However, he believes that the infallibility of divine intelli-
gence and will does not eliminate the contingency of things. It neither represents a threat
to freedom, nor does it mitigate the contingent nature of much natural causes. Thomas’s
world is not deterministic in the sense that the sum of physical and free causes does not
necessarily produce the future states of affairs.
For Aquinas, the mere divine foreknowledge of contingent events does not necessitate
them. Because of knowledge’s very mode of being, to know an event in no way affects
its contingency or its necessity. Taking up an idea from Boethius, Aquinas explains that
my knowledge of “Socrates sitting” does not necessarily cause Socrates to be sitting (S.Th.,
I, q. 14, a. 13, co.). By the very nature of his agency, Socrates is free to be sitting or
standing. Similarly, I can certainly know that “it is raining now”, but raining is, by its very
nature, a contingent event. My certain knowledge of what is happening does not nullify its
contingency.
While Socrates is sitting, it is necessary to affirm that Socrates is sitting and, while it
is raining, it is necessary to affirm that it is raining. The same is true for past events: it is
necessary to affirm that Socrates remained seated in prison on his death day, although he
was free to get up and leave, it is necessary to affirm that, on the eve of Waterloo, it rained,
although it might not have rained. This is the merely “hypothetical” or “conditional”
necessity to which Aristotle had already referred: “What is, insofar as it is, it is necessary
that it be” (De interpretatione, 19a23–4). Now, this type of necessity resides in the proposition,
not in the thing; the thing is, by its very nature, contingent, necessary, or free, according to
the intrinsic ontological elements that constitute it. The observer’s knowledge cannot alter
this.
In the case of divine foreknowledge of contingent futures, St. Thomas also makes
use of a metaphor partly inspired in Boethius (S.Th., I, q. 14, a. 13, ad 3): God would be
like an observer surveying a road from a mountain; while the people on the side of the
road only notice who passes by them, the elevated observer can also see the walkers who
have not yet arrived at a certain point and those who have already crossed it. Likewise,
God, from the watchtower of His eternity, could contemplate past, present, and future,
for He possesses a kind of specific perspective, since He does not live temporal events as
successive but in their respective actuality.
The divine eternal knowledge of temporal things cannot be understood as if, thanks to
eternity, things somewhat “inform” God about them and thus He learns the events. Rather,
Aquinas believes that the divine understanding knows the truths concerning temporal
things not as our intelligence, which should adapt to those things, but rather temporal
things should adapt to divine intellect (De veritate, q. 1, a. 2, co.). For this reason, divine
knowledge with respect to created things cannot dispense with the divine will to create
this world with these precise characteristics (S.Th., I, q. 14, a. 8). After all, every contingent
thing depends on divine will and this will “is always fulfilled” (S.Th., I, q. 19, a. 6). This
does not prevent Aquinas from affirming that the divine will is neither a direct nor an
indirect cause of sin, because God does not will sin in any way, although He “permits” that
some persons will to commit sin (S.Th., I, q. 19, a. 9; I-II, q. 79, a. 1).
Now, divine intervention on contingent things neither dissolves their contingency, nor
cancels freedom even if it moves created free will to do a good deed. Furthermore, infallible
divine will ensures the contingent nature of contingent things (Torrijos-Castrillejo 2019, pp.
445–46). Things do not become contingent insofar as God “steps back” and “makes room”
for contingency, but it is precisely the efficacy of divine will that safeguards that contingent
events are such (S.Th., I, q. 19, a. 8).
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Perhaps this can be well understood with the help of an example given by Oderberg
(2016, pp. 214–15) in an article on this subject. He tells us how he was teaching his son to
write:
“[ . . . ] I sometimes hold his hand [sc. my son’s hand] while it grips the pencil,
guiding his formation of the letters. Sometimes I force his hand to move in a
certain direction, to be sure, but most of the time I do not. So let us focus on the
times I do not force his hand. My son has free will: he has the power within
himself not to comply with my physical guidance. Sometimes he does not, and
his hand moves willfully off in the wrong direction. I am not responsible for that
transgression: if he wants to depart from my guidance he can, since I am not
compelling him. But consider the cases where he does freely comply. Here, he
willingly submits to my physical guidance (not to mention my moral exhortation)
and moves his hand in accordance with the motion of my own guiding hand.
Although my son has the power to do otherwise, he does not exercise it”.
I think this example is interesting because our experience reveals this type of rela-
tionship with causes subordinate to us. When a principal free agent intends to achieve
an effect by means of a subordinate free cause, there are only two possibilities: either the
influence on the subordinated cause is so soft as it can be refused, or the self-determination
of the subordinate cause is suppressed by coercing its body. In that sense, a created prin-
cipal free agent must “leave space” to the subordinate free agent if he wants the latter to
continue to act freely, but in such a case he cannot determine the outcome of his action.
However, when Aquinas says that God works upon free agents by concretely ordering
the outcome of each deliberate action (e.g., S.c.G., III, 91–2), He does so in such a way that
His concurrence does not abridge their freedom in any way, but it is not limited to a mere
soft influence. It could not just be a “moral motion”, as Molinism thinks, which would
make God both the conservator of the created power to act and a cooperative cause of the
new act produced by the creature, so that God would not be responsible for the actual
causation itself (De Molina 1588, pp. 169–70). Within Aquinas’s metaphysics, God does
not only cause the things but also their capacity to cause and even the actual use of this
capacity. God’s constant conservation is necessary for creatures to continue to exist and, in
a similar way, His continuous intervention in their capacity to produce the being of another
thing each time it is originated is required (S.Th., I, q. 105, a. 5; Silva 2014, p. 281). For this
reason, He cannot only intervene in the power and in the new act produced by it, but also
in the causation itself.
Ultimately, the view that leads to “making space” for freedom and contingency insofar
as God should “step back” from creation tends to see divine causality as if it were a created
one. However, Aquinas insists on the transcendent nature of divine causality. God is not a
cause comparable to created causes that enter into categorical orders of causation: either
they are necessary or they are contingent. God, on the contrary, stands outside both orders;
He transcends them (In Metaph., VI, lect. 3; Thomas Aquinatis 1964, §1222; Roszak 2017,
pp. 6–9; Torrijos-Castrillejo 2020a, pp. 166–71). God is outside any finite order. Let us recall
that an event is intrinsically contingent if its cause is contingent (i.e., if it is such a cause
that can be impeded) and necessary if its cause is necessary (i.e., if it cannot be impeded in
any natural way). If God is outside both orders of causality, even if His action is infallible
and no event escapes from His providence’s order, the events do not receive their own
qualification by divine action, but by their proximate causes. That means that an event
could be infallible for divine action while absolutely contingent provided its proximate
cause is a contingent one. Necessity and contingency represent characteristics of created
ways of causation. Divine infallibility is beyond contingency as well as necessity.
The idea of the transcendence of divine action should not lead us to a certain deism
by virtue of which we would reduce divine intervention to a generic influence that is
only determined via created causes. Divine transcendence does not mean that God only
acts with a general providence and merely causes “the being” or “the conservation” of
things in a broad way. Rather, all novelty in the world, with all its minutiae and all the
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richness it contains, is due to an active and detailed exercise of providence (Bonino 2020,
231–32). Nevertheless, this transcendent and therefore incomprehensible nature of the
divine way of acting in all things implies that, although divine providence foresees sins as
something hateful and not willed by it but only tolerated, God is in no way the cause of
them (S.Th., I-II, q. 79, a. 2). It is difficult for us to understand how God can have foreseen
and tolerated all the elements of which an evil action consists without Himself being the
cause of it, but the disorder of sin as such is not willed by providence either as a means or
as an end. Above all, it is necessary to recognize that the type of causal influence by which
God moves and guides creatures, created and preserved by Him, surpasses our intelligence
and probably constitutes an idea more difficult to understand than creatio ex nihilo itself
(Torrijos-Castrillejo 2020b, p. 454).
6. Conclusions
In contrast to classical mechanics, quantum mechanics, and other new areas of con-
temporary science, such as the theory of evolution, seem to require an ontology able to
explain a flexible nature capable of acting on its own. Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics
and traditional theism do not constitute an obstacle as such for the explanation of the new
kind of facts discovered. Indeed, as recently expressed by Feser (2019, p. 310), “quantum
mechanics, is as neutral between Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian interpretations as [ . . . ]
relativity theory is when rightly understood. But an even stronger claim can be made,
because there is a sense in which quantum mechanics actually points toward Aristotelian-
ism[.]” As we have suggested, the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of causality may be even
more apt to explain contemporary physics than various philosophies elaborated in moder-
nity. Process theology is thus not the only alternative for elaborating a system of thought
consistent with the new discoveries regarding physical nature. Unlike it, classical theism
allows us to safeguard a conception of God that makes Him more relevant for the religious
man: an omniscient and almighty God who can hear our prayers and elaborate plans to
seek the concrete good for each believer.
Particular providence could be justified with a Molinist approach, but this theological
system shares with process theology the idea that God must “step back” from His creature
to some extent, in order to “make room” for contingency and freedom. However, Molinism
in fact conceives of nature and free will in an intrinsically deterministic way. In contrast,
Thomism understands that God, the cause of contingency and freedom, can move creatures
in a concrete and infallible way without harm to created action. Although the combination
of divine action plus created action brings about determinate results, created things are, in
each case, intrinsically and absolutely (simpliciter) contingent or free. Only in an accessory
or improper sense (secundum quid) could it be said that events are necessary because they are
under the control of the infallible divine will, which acts in a way that is incomprehensive
for us and does not interfere with the nature of every event.
This sort of philosophy of providence does not need to safeguard contingency by
reducing the efficacy of the divine motion, but rather, above all, it bears on divine tran-
scendence. On the opposite side of process theology in this regard, a Thomistic God is not
part of the world. The world may well remain contingent even if God has a determinate
knowledge of all things and acts effectively in the course of events. His incomprehensible
transcendence places divine activity on a transcendent level that allows Him to act without
altering the intimate nature of things.
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